CVE-2026-109518: APT HTTP Retry Can Swap a Verified .deb - Floor 3.0.4 / USN-8996-1

CVE-2026-109518 is a package-verification bypass in APT. Debian's security team (DSA-6607-1, 4 November 2026) says Max Justicz found that APT can merge two different package downloads after an HTTP redirect gives them the same URI, and that improper file handling when resuming an HTTP download lets a man-in-the-middle replace a package after verification, so arbitrary code runs as root. APT maintainer Julian Andres Klode labelled it a critical file verification bypass on the deity list the same day. Canonical rates it High, CVSS 4.0 7.7 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/...). Debian's DSA does not publish a CVSS. Those are vendor numbers, not one fact.[1][2][6]
The chicken-and-egg: the tool that patches the box is the bug. Upgrade apt itself with Acquire::Retries=0. Do not start a normal apt upgrade of the rest of the world first.
It is not in CISA KEV catalog 2026.11.13 (1,781 entries). Absence from KEV is not “safe.”[11]
What it is
APT downloads .deb files over HTTP(S), checks them against signed archive metadata, then runs maintainer scripts as root. The archive signature is supposed to make the mirror and the transport untrusted. This bug breaks that assumption on the HTTP retry/resume path.[2][6]
Klode's wording: a remote attacker can bypass verification of downloaded packages using redirects and standard transient HTTP server errors that cause APT to retry downloads, leading APT to override existing hardlinks with a chosen payload. Because debs install as root, that is RCE as root.[2]
The salsa fix (5af16a8a, message “Open target files exclusively”) stops writing into a destination that might already be a hard link. Comment in the patch: “Open the file exclusively to avoid injection attacks by links.” That is the engine bug as the maintainers described it - not a PoC from us.[3]
Required conditions, from primary pages we fetched:
- The client follows HTTP redirects and retries package-file downloads.[4]
Acquire::Retriesis non-zero. Default 3 starting with Debian 12 (bookworm) and Ubuntu 22.04 LTS. Older releases are unaffected in a default configuration; scripts that set retries on older APT can still be in scope.[2][4][6]- The attacker is on-path (can manipulate HTTP, including a malicious mirror or proxy) and the client actually installs a package.[4][6]
- Canonical: HTTPS/TLS stops the on-path case. FTP is not this bug. Snaps are not this bug. A malicious HTTP mirror still is, until the client is patched - TLS does not replace the APT update.[6][10]
This is not:
- Yesterday's Proxmox PSA-2026-00082 LXC mount TOCTOU. Different package (
pve-container), different bug. - A cPanel / Plesk / LiteSpeed CVE. Those panels on Alma/Rocky talk dnf, not APT.
- Unauthenticated internet RCE against a web vhost. Nothing answers on :80 for this. The window is
apt update/apt install/ unattended-upgrades.
How serious is it?
- Debian DSA-6607-1: no CVSS. Outcome stated: arbitrary code as root after post-verification package replace.[1]
- Klode / deity APT-2026-11-01: “critical file verification bypass”; RCE because debs run as root.[2]
- Canonical blog + CVE page: Ubuntu priority High. CVSS 4.0 7.7 with Attack Requirements: Present and User Interaction: Present (the “interaction” is the box installing a package). Same CVE, different scoring system than a 3.1 9.8 unauth web RCE. Cite Canonical for Ubuntu packages.[6][7]
- AWS bulletin 2026-172-AWS (updated 9 Nov): “Important (requires attention)”. Ubuntu 22.04+ and Debian 12+ affected in their default configuration.[10]
- Not in KEV (catalog 2026.11.13, 1,781 rows). No CISA “actively exploited” stamp that we can cite.[11]
Blast radius in a hosting fleet is every Debian/Ubuntu/Proxmox node that still has HTTP apt sources and a vulnerable apt, the first time it fetches packages. That includes unattended-upgrades, CI images, and Proxmox no-subscription hosts whose enterprise repo is off.
Who is affected
In scope from pages we fetched:
| Tree | Vulnerable (examples) | Floor |
|---|---|---|
| Debian 13 trixie | apt 3.0.3 (main) |
3.0.4 (trixie-security, DSA-6607-1)[1][4] |
| Debian 12 bookworm | 2.6.1 (main) | 2.6.2 (bookworm-security, DLA-4880-1)[4] |
| Debian unstable | before 3.3.6 | 3.3.6 / sid 3.3.7[2][4] |
| Ubuntu 26.10 | before 3.3.3ubuntu0.1 | 3.3.3ubuntu0.1 (USN-8996-1)[8] |
| Ubuntu 26.04 LTS | before 3.2.1ubuntu0.1 | 3.2.1ubuntu0.1[8] |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTS | before 2.8.4ubuntu0.1 | 2.8.4ubuntu0.1[8] |
| Ubuntu 22.04 LTS | before 2.4.15ubuntu0.1 | 2.4.15ubuntu0.1[8] |
| Ubuntu 20.04 / 18.04 / 16.04 / 14.04 | default retries 0 unless you set them; ESM floors exist | 2.0.12+esm1 / 1.6.19+esm1 / 1.2.36+esm1 / 1.0.1ubuntu2.24+esm4 (Ubuntu Pro)[6][8] |
Klode also lists upstream branch floors: 1.2.36, 1.4.12, 1.6.19, 1.8.2.4, 2.0.12, 2.2.5, 2.4.15, 2.6.2, 2.8.4, 3.0.4, 3.2.1.[2]
Proxmox VE is Debian. A forum thread on 10 November (user post, not a Proxmox PSA) points at DSA-6607-1 and notes no-subscription HTTP download.proxmox.com as the MITM path; enterprise HTTPS is a different transport. Treat that as operator discussion, not a vendor advisory. The apt floor on a PVE host is still the Debian apt package, not pve-manager.[9]
Out of scope unless you prove otherwise: RHEL / Alma / Rocky / CloudLinux dnf/yum. Fedora. Snap-only installs. APT sources that are already HTTPS end-to-end for the on-path case (still patch - Canonical and AWS both say TLS does not replace the client fix). Debian 11 is past Debian LTS in the tracker we fetched; we did not see a DSA floor for bullseye. Do not invent one.[4][6][10]
What to do now
- See which
aptyou actually run, and whether retries are on.
dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}\n' apt
apt --version
apt-config dump Acquire::Retries
grep -RInE 'Acquire::Retries|deb http://' /etc/apt/apt.conf /etc/apt/apt.conf.d /etc/apt/sources.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d 2>/dev/null
Want Acquire::Retries "0"; or a version at/above the floor for your release. apt --version printing 3.0.3 on trixie is not done.
- Patch
aptwith retries off for that one transaction. Canonical, AWS, and the Proxmox forum all use this shape. The vulnerable client is the one fetching the fixed package.[6][8][10]
Debian trixie / bookworm / Proxmox:
apt-get -o Acquire::Retries=0 update
apt-get -o Acquire::Retries=0 install --only-upgrade apt
dpkg-query -W apt
# trixie: 3.0.4 or newer from *-security
# bookworm: 2.6.2 or newer from *-security
Ubuntu 22.04+:
apt-get -o Acquire::Retries=0 update
apt-get -o Acquire::Retries=0 install --only-upgrade apt
# or Canonical's source-package selector:
# apt install -o Acquire::Retries=0 --only-upgrade '?source-package(^apt$)'
dpkg-query -W apt
If you cannot get a security mirror yet, drop retries until you can:
printf 'Acquire::Retries "0";\n' > /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99-cve-2026-109518
apt-config dump Acquire::Retries
Jan Schaumann's oss-security note is the same workaround. Delete the drop-in after the fixed binary is installed if you want retries back; the patched client no longer needs it for this CVE.[5]
-
Then upgrade the rest of the box. DSA-6607-1 also ships out-of-bounds hardening. Klode says those are DoS in daemons that parse untrusted
.debfiles (PackageKit / aptdaemon), not a second RCE. Still take the package.[1][2] -
HTTP sources are the remaining condition, not the fix. Canonical documents flipping Ubuntu archive URLs to
https://. AWS: HTTPS reduces conditions, does not replace updatingapt. Community country mirrors often lack HTTPS - testapt-get updateafter the sed, do not assume.[6][10] -
Rebuild images. AWS: container images and AMIs keep the old
aptuntil you rebuild or run the same command on the running node. A “refreshed AMI next week” does nothing for a VM you launched yesterday.[10] -
unattended-upgrades is not a free pass. Canonical says it is on by default from 16.04 and will apply the security update within 24 hours. The first fetch of the new
aptstill goes through the old client unless you setAcquire::Retries=0(or already use HTTPS). Prefer an explicit--only-upgrade apton fleet hosts rather than waiting for the timer.[6]
Versions with no DSA / USN floor
- Debian 11 bullseye: not in the DSA-6607-1 / tracker table we fetched. Past Debian LTS. Do not assume 3.0.4 exists there.[4]
- Ubuntu 20.04 and older: default retries 0, so default installs are out of this CVE per Canonical. ESM packages exist if you turned retries on. Need Ubuntu Pro for those floors.[6][8]
- Anything not APT (dnf, zypper, pacman): different code.
How to spot a compromise
Nobody we cite (DSA, Canonical, AWS, CISA KEV) reports exploitation. An actual hit looks like root after a package fetch, not a webshell in wp-content.
Look around the last apt / unattended-upgrades run:
- unexpected packages in
/var/log/apt/history.logandterm.log - maintainer scripts or new units under
/etc/systemd/system/you did not ship - new root SSH keys, crons, or
ld.sopreload - HTTP apt-cacher-ng / approx / internal mirrors - every client behind a poisoned cache trusts it
Keep those logs before you tidy. We are not publishing exploit steps.
FAQ
Is there a patch? Yes. Debian apt 3.0.4 (trixie, DSA-6607-1) and 2.6.2 (bookworm, DLA-4880-1), 4 Nov 2026. Ubuntu USN-8996-1 the same day. Unstable 3.3.6.[1][2][4][8]
Do I need to be on HTTP? For the classic MITM, yes. Canonical: TLS via HTTPS protects against on-path manipulation. A malicious mirror can still abuse the client until apt is patched. Patch anyway.[6][10]
Does this hit Proxmox? The hypervisor runs Debian APT. There is no Proxmox PSA in the thread we read - a user report on 10 Nov about no-subscription HTTP. Check dpkg-query -W apt on every node. pveversion is the wrong floor.[9]
Will apt-get upgrade without -o Acquire::Retries=0 save me? It might, if the path is already HTTPS and the mirror is honest. Canonical and AWS still tell you to pass Retries=0 for the update that installs the fix. Do that.[6][10]
Has it been exploited? Not in KEV as of 2026.11.13. DSA, USN, and AWS do not claim in-the-wild use. We are not treating blog “APT RCE” headlines as evidence.[11]
Honesty
- We did not exploit this.
- DSA has no CVSS. Ubuntu 7.7 High (CVSS 4.0) with AT:P and UI:P. Klode said critical in the deity mail. We printed all three; we did not pick a 9.8.[1][2][6]
- Not on KEV. Not a ransomware-flagged KEV row.[11]
- Mechanism is redirect + retry + hardlink reuse as described by Debian/Canonical/the salsa exclusive-open patch. We did not reconstruct a working swap.
- Proxmox HTTPS-on-no-subscription is forum opinion, not a Proxmox Security Advisory.[9]
- Debian 11 floor: unverified.
- Same DSA also patches OOB issues Klode says are DoS, not this RCE. Do not conflate them.[2]
Sources
[1] https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2026/msg00526.html - DSA-6607-1, apt 3.0.4, 4 Nov 2026
[2] https://lists.debian.org/deity/2026/11/msg00005.html - Julian Andres Klode, APT-2026-11-01
[3] https://salsa.debian.org/apt-team/apt/-/commit/5af16a8ad0f155233dfb10b7c92ad1903112ef79 - exclusive file open
[4] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-109518 - bookworm 2.6.2 / trixie 3.0.4, retries default
[5] https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q4/519 - Jan Schaumann, oss-security, Retries 0 workaround
[6] https://ubuntu.com/blog/apt-vulnerability-fixes-available - High, CVSS 4.0 7.7, HTTPS and retries notes
[7] https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-109518 - Ubuntu CVE page, 4 Nov 2026
[8] https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8996-1 - package floors
[9] https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/regarding-apt-security-update-dsa-6607-1-cve-2026-109518.187505/ - operator thread, 10 Nov 2026
[10] https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-172-aws/ - bulletin 2026-172-AWS, updated 9 Nov 2026
[11] https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json - catalog 2026.11.13, 1,781 entries, no CVE-2026-109518